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Abstract
This paper uses a novel dataset to test the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis in a
cross-section of countries. It is shown that for the full sample there exists evidence in favor of
the hypothesis. When we arbitrarily split the full sample into OECD and non-OECD countries,
we ﬁnd no evidence in favor of the hypothesis for the OECD subsample, but strong evidence for
t h en o n - O E C Ds u b s a m p l e .W h e nw eu s eH a n s e n ’ s(2000) endogenous threshold methodology we
ﬁnd that initial literacy rates and initial per capita output are threshold variables that can cluster
countries into three distinct regimes that obey diﬀerent statistical models. In particular, the
regime with moderate initial per capita income but low initial education exhibits substantially
higher capital-skill complementarity than the regime with low income and low education and
the regime with high education. This cross-country nonlinearity in capital-skill complementarity
is consistent with the time-series nonlinearity found by Goldin and Katz (1998) using U.S.
manufacturing data, and promotes the view that the phenomenon maybe a transitory one.
Keywords: Capital-skill complementarity, nonlinearities, parameter heterogeneity, regimes.
JEL classiﬁcation: O40, O47.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper reports new ﬁndings on Griliches’ (1969) hypothesis of capital-skill complementarity.
The hypothesis states that capital is more complementary with skilled than unskilled labor. Grilich-
es’ hypothesis has received renewed attention in the macroeconomics literature as researchers are
determined to move away from the straight-jacket Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation. Evidence in favor of
the hypothesis would have important implications both in guidance on how to specify the aggregate
production function in theoretical work, but also in reassessing the robustness of existing empirical
ﬁndings. The hypothesis is especially relevant to the growth literature as it pertains to the contro-
versy about the two competing determinants of economic growth, namely input accumulation and
technical progress. In particular, evidence in favor of the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis
would elevate the relative importance of input accumulation (such as physical and human capital)
in promoting growth.
The earliest use of capital-skill complementarity in the macroeconomics-growth literature is
Galor and Weil (1996).1 More recently there is an emerging literature that is interested in the
empirical/quantitative implications of the hypothesis; see, e.g. Flug and Hercowitz (2000), Krusell,
Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000), Caselli and Coleman (2002, 2004), Ruiz-Arranz (2002),
Caselli and Wilson (2004), Duﬀy, Papageorgiou and Perez-Sebastian (2004) and Lindquist (2004).
There is also an emerging theoretical literature in which the main force of the development process
stems from the assumption of capital-skill complementarity; see, e.g. Stockey (1996), Galor and
Moav (2000, 2002, forthcoming) and Galor and Weil (2000).2
In this paper, we use a new cross-country dataset (constructed by Caselli and Coleman (2004))
to test the hypothesis. The novelty of this dataset is that it contains observations on wages of
skilled and unskilled labor across a wide range of developed and developing countries. Cross-
country data on wages of skilled/unskilled labor are scarce and present us with a unique opportunity
to test the hypothesis using simple linear econometric estimation techniques. This is important
as recent papers use highly nonlinear nested Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution (CES) aggregate
1These authors argued that due to this complementarity, the relative wages of women will increase in the process
of development, and would permit a reduction in fertility along with an increase in female labor force participation.
Their underlying assumption is that women have relatively lower innate endowment of physical labor and thus
relatively more endowment of mental (skilled) labor.
2In addition, the hypothesis has been extensively tested by many microeconomic studies that used ﬁrm and
industry-level data. For a representative sample of such studies see Hamermesh (1993).Nonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 2
production functions which are shown to be quite diﬃcult to accurately estimate. Even though our
examination of the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis is limited to a single year and a sample
of 46 countries, we show that signiﬁcant progress can be made in understanding the hypothesis’
role and potential implications.
The main ﬁndings of the paper are as follows: First we ﬁnd that for our full sample of 46
countries there exists evidence in favor of the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis. Second,
when we arbitrarily split our sample into OECD and non-OECD subsamples, we ﬁnd no evidence in
favor of the hypothesis for the OECD subsample but strong evidence for the non-OECD subsample.
Third, after employing the data-sorting method developed by Hansen (2000), that allows the data
to endogenously select regimes, we ﬁnd that initial literacy rates and initial per capita output
are threshold variables that can cluster countries into three distinct regimes that obey diﬀerent
statistical models. Our last ﬁnding reveals that countries with low initial literacy rates (below 68%)
but respectable initial per capita output (above $2042), exhibit capital-skill complementarity that
is substantially more pronounced than in countries with low literacy (below 68%) and low income
(below $2042), and in countries with high literacy (above 68%). This cross-country nonlinearity
in capital-skill complementarity is qualitatively consistent with the time-series nonlinearity found
by Goldin and Katz (1998) using U.S. manufacturing data. Both results point to the intriguing
possibility that capital-skill complementarity is a transitory phenomenon.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes alternative approaches in
testing the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis and discusses the speciﬁc approach used in this
paper. Section 3 discusses the data, estimation method and results, paying particular attention
to the potential existence of multiple regimes with diﬀerent levels of capita-skill complementarity.
Section 4 examines the robustness of our baseline results to alternative speciﬁcations and threshold
models. Section 5 discusses the implications of our ﬁndings to the existing literature. Section 6
concludes.
2 Testing the Capital-Skill Complementarity Hypothesis
There are at least three ways by which the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis can be empir-
ically tested. First, the hypothesis can be tested using the aggregate production function directly.
Second, it can be tested using a two-step conditional approach. Finally, it can be tested using aNonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 3
quasi-ﬁxed cost function approach. We brieﬂy discuss these approaches next.
2.1 The nested-CES production function approach
A functional form that is general enough to accommodate diﬀerent elasticities of substitution is the
two-level CES production speciﬁcation that was pioneered by Sato (1967). A special case of this
functional form is given by
Y = A
q
a[bKθ +( 1− b)Sθ]ρ/θ +( 1− a)Nρ
r1/ρ
, (1)
where Y is aggregate output, K is capital stock, S is skilled labor, N is unskilled labor, A is a
positive technological parameter, a, b are distribution parameters and θ, ρ ≤ 1 are the elasticity of
substitution parameters (θ = ρ = 0 imply the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation).
Equation (1) implies that the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis holds iﬀ ρ > θ.3 This
approach, which requires estimation of ρ and θ directly from the two-level CES function given
by equation (1), involves using nonlinear estimation techniques.4 As demonstrated by Duﬀy, Pa-
pageorgiou and Perez-Sebastian (2004), notwithstanding substantial improvements in nonlinear
estimation, obtaining reliable estimates of the relative size of elasticity parameters (ρ and θ)p r o v e s
to be quite cumbersome and problematic. This is primarily because the relevant elasticity para-
meters depend crucially on the curvature (not the slope) of the production function thus making
them second order parameters and diﬃcult to accurately estimate.
2.2 The two-step conditional approach
The second approach, employed by Fallon and Layard (1975), is to use the production function in
equation (1) along with competitive market conditions to obtain the following two equations:
ln(r/w1)=l n [ b/(1 − b)] + (θ − 1)ln(K/S)( 2 )
3For general production technologies with more than two inputs there is no single deﬁnition for the elasticity
of substitution between pairs of inputs. The two most commonly used deﬁnitions are the Allen-Partial Elasticity
of Substitution (APES) and Direct Elasticity of Substitution (DES). APES measures the percentage change in the
ratio of two inputs in response to a change in the ratio of the two input prices, holding all other prices and output
quantity constant. DES measures the percentage change in the ratio of two inputs in response to a change in the
ratio of the two input prices, holding all other prices, inputs and output quantity constant. Duﬀy, Papageorgiou
and Perez-Sebastian (2004, pp. 329-330) have shown that in the two-level CES speciﬁcation (1) the capital-skill
complementarity hypothesis holds iﬀ ρ > θ regardless of which elasticity measure is used.
4Alternatively, estimation of a more disaggregated production function is possible, e.g. through the use of a
translog speciﬁcation (see, e.g. Bergstr¨ om and Panas (1992), and Ruiz-Arranz (2002)). However, much of the focus
has been placed on the two-level CES speciﬁcations used extensively in recent papers that attempt to examine the
implications of the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis.Nonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 4
ln(q/w2)=l n [ a/(1 − a)] + (ρ − 1)ln
k
b(K/N)
θ +( 1− b)(S/N)
θ
l1/θ
, (3)
where a, b, θ, ρ are as deﬁned previously, r is rental income, q is the price of the product
[bKθ +( 1− b)Sθ]1/θ,a n dw1 and w2 are average wages of skilled and unskilled labor, respectively.
Obviously, equations (2-3) ought to be estimated sequentially, since equation (2) provides an esti-
mated coeﬃcient for θ needed to construct the variables q and
k
b(K/N)
θ +( 1− b)(S/N)
θ
l1/θ
in
equation (3).5 Once again the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis holds iﬀ ρ > θ. The basic
diﬃculty in testing the hypothesis using this approach is the lack of reliable international data on
interest rates. In addition, employing a two-stage conditional estimation procedure may result in
biased estimates.
2.3 The quasi-ﬁxed cost function approach
A third approach based on Brown and Christensen (1981) derives a skilled-labor share equation
of a quasi-ﬁxed cost function that has a translog form. After cost minimization under constant
returns to scale, the following “share equation” is obtained:
S1 = α1 + γ11 ln(w1/w2)+γ1K ln(K/Y ), (4)
where S1 is the skilled-labor share of the total wage bill, w1/w2 is skilled to unskilled labor wage
premium, and K/Y is the capital-output ratio. A positive coeﬃcient for γ1K in equation (4) implies
capital-skill complementarity. This is because when capital and skilled labor are complements, an
increase in capital intensity (K/Y ) causes an increase in the skilled-labor share of the total wage
bill (S1). Similarly, a positive coeﬃcient for γ11 implies skilled-unskilled labor complementarity.
The logic is the same as above. An increase in the skilled-unskilled labor wage premium (w1/w2)
causes an increase in the skilled-labor share of the total wage bill. Finally, α1 can be interpreted
as the average of the skilled-labor share. Derivation of equation (4) appears in the appendix.
In this paper, we will be testing the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis by using equation
(4) as our baseline estimation equation. Even though, there are quite a few studies that use
industry-level data in equation (4) to test the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis (see, e.g.
Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Berman, Bound and Machin (1998), and Goldin and Katz
(1998)), to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that uses aggregate cross-country data.
5For more discussion on this approach see Fallon and Layard (1975, pp. 285-286).Nonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 5
An advantage of using equation (4) is that we can sidestep the cumbersome nonlinear estimation
(and the problems associated with it) required by equation (1) and use standard linear econometric
estimation techniques in testing the hypothesis. More importantly, equation (4) allows us to ex-
amine the sensitivity of the baseline results from the full sample to alternative subsamples. This is
essential to this paper, as we want to search for potential nonlinearities in capital-skill complemen-
tarity across the development process. It is worth noting that testing the hypothesis for subsamples
of countries by using equation (1) is not possible given the current availability of data, as the sig-
niﬁcant reduction in sample size does not permit for the accurate estimation of the curvature of
the production function.
3 Data, Estimation and Results
Our estimation of equation (4) involves cross-sectional data on 52 countries. We consider both linear
least squares regressions as well as threshold estimation techniques to obtain parameter estimates.
We begin by brieﬂy describing the data used in our estimation.
3.1 The data
We use a novel cross-country dataset constructed by Caselli and Colleman (2003) to estimate the
“share equation” (4). The novelty of our dataset lies on availability of observations on wages of
skilled and unskilled labor across a wide range of developed and developing countries. In addition,
the dataset includes observations on skilled-labor shares and capital-output ratio. The downside is
that our examination of the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis is limited to a single year for
a sample of 46 countries which cross-country wage data are available.
More speciﬁcally, data for skilled-labor share (S1), skilled to unskilled wage premium (w1/w2),
capital stock (K) and output (Y ) are from Caselli and Coleman (2003) who in turn obtained these
data from the following sources:6
• Data for K and Y are from Hall and Jones (1999). Y is GDP per worker in international
dollars and K is the stock of capital per worker estimated using the perpetual inventory
method. The data for K and Y are for 1988.
6For more discussion on these data and their sources see Caselli and Colleman (2004, pp. 6-9, 30—31).Nonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 6
• Data for w1/w2 are from Bills and Klenow (2000) and Caselli and Coleman’s calculations.
Caselli and Coleman (2003) estimate wi
1/wi
2 as exp(βin), where βi is the Mincerian return in
country i,a n dn is the diﬀerence in schooling years between skilled labor (Li
1) and unskilled
labor (Li
2). The cross-country Mincerian returns data are from Bills and Klenow (2000) (who
in turn obtained the data from Psacharopoulos (1994)) and diﬀerences in schooling years data
are from Lee (2001).
• Data for S1 are constructed from the Barro and Lee (1993) dataset, and authors’ calculations.
By deﬁnition S1 = w1L1
w1L1+w2L2. However, since data on wages are available only as the ratio
of skilled to unskilled labor (w1/w2), we make a simple transformation to rewrite S1 =
(w1/w2)L1
(w1/w2)L1+L2. L2 (unskilled labor) is constructed as an aggregate of workers with no education
and with some primary education, whereas L1 (skilled labor) is an aggregate of the remaining
labor. The data for L1and L2 are from Barro and Lee (1993) for the year 1985.
For our threshold estimation exercises we use data on initial (1960) output per worker (from
Penn World Tables 5.6), and initial (1960) adult literacy rates deﬁned as the fraction of population
over the age of 15 that is able to read and write (from the World Bank’s World Report). Due to data
constraints with initial literacy rates our sample is reduced from 52 countries (the original Caselli-
Coleman sample) to 46 countries.7 We note that in all but the threshold estimation regressions
which require data on initial literacy rates, we perform robustness tests of our results to the 52-
country sample. All of the data used in this paper appear in Table A1 in the appendix.
3.2 Estimation
We obtain parameter estimates for four diﬀerent models based on equation (4) using ordinary least
squares (OLS). Given the small number of observations in our full sample and the subsamples
considered, we have implemented the bootstrap which performs inference that is more reliable in
ﬁnite samples than inferences based on conventional asymptotic theory.8
In our baseline model (Model 1), we estimate equation (4) in which the regressors are logs of
the skilled to unskilled labor wage ratio (w1/w2), and the capital-output ratio (K/Y ) . With the
relevant coeﬃcient for capital-skill complementarity (γ1K) in mind, we also examine the robustness
7The countries excluded from the Caselli-Coleman sample are Botswana, China, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Taiwan.
8In particular, samples are randomly drawn (with replacement) from the OLS residuals and the ﬁtted values are
used to estimate the coeﬃcients as means of 1000 replications of the procedure.Nonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 7
of the results from our baseline model by estimating three modiﬁcations of equation (4): Following
Goldin and Katz (1998 pp. 720-722) we consider an estimation equation that drops w1/w2 (Model
2) and another that drops w1/w2 and adds an output (Y ) variable (Model 3). Finally, we estimate
an equation that includes all variables, w1/w2, K/Y and Y (Model 4). The reason for eliminating
w1/w2 in Model 2 is that cross-sectional wage variation could largely reﬂect skill diﬀerences and not
exogenous wage variations. Also, the estimates could suﬀer from a division bias since w2 appears
in the denominators of both the dependent variable and the wage premium variable. The reason
for adding Y in Modes 3 and 4 is to account for cyclical diﬀerences in the extend to which skilled
and unskilled labor are quasi-ﬁxed factors. Also, the addition of Y allows for the possibility that
the production function is non-homothetic.
Recent papers by Durlauf and Johnson (1995), Brock and Durlauf (2000), Durlauf, Kourtellos
and Minkin (2001), and Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2004), argue that the assumption of a single
linear model representing all countries is inappropriate. Put diﬀerently, parameter homogeneity,
which implies that model parameters are country-invariant, is implausible in light of the vast het-
erogeneity that exists among countries. Following this literature, in addition to obtaining parameter
estimates in the entire sample and arbitrarily chosen subsamples (i.e. OECD and non-OECD), we
also employ Hansen’s (2000) data-splitting methodology to examine the possibility of parameter
heterogeneity and nonlinearities in our capital-skill complementarity equation (4).
3.3 Estimation results from the entire sample
We start by testing the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis using our full sample of 46
countries. Results from all four models are presented in Table 1. In our baseline Model 1 (column
2), the relevant coeﬃc i e n te s t i m a t eo fγ1K is 0.34620 and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
This is evidence in favor of capital-skill complementarity in the full sample. Columns 3-5 in Table
1, show that our baseline model result is robust to the alternative Models 2-4. In particular,
coeﬃcient estimates of γ1K are 0.34780 in Model 2, 0.19286 in Model 3 and 0.15743 in Model 4,
and are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level, 1% level, and 5% level, respectively.
It is also interesting to notice that the coeﬃcient estimate for Y is positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant in both Models 3 and 4 which may suggest that the production function is non-homothetic.
As expected inclusion of Y in Models 3 and 4 reduces the magnitude of γ1K but does not change
our key result of capital-skill complementarity. The estimates of γ11 in Model 1 is negative and inNonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 8
Table 1: Cross-country regressions for full sample
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.44598∗∗∗
(0.05823)
0.42889∗∗∗
(0.03755)
−0.43172∗
(0.24314)
−0.73992∗∗
(0.30178)
ln(w1/w2) −0.04024
(0.10331)
0.17359
(0.10412)
ln(K/Y )0 .34620∗∗∗
(0.05055)
0.34780∗∗∗
(0.04979)
0.19286∗∗∗
(0.06223)
0.15743∗∗
(0.06438)
lnY 0.10384∗∗∗
(0.02907)
0.13215∗∗∗
(0.03317)
s.e.e. 0.68344 0.68406 0.53294 0.49885
Adj. R2 0.51 0.51 0.62 0.63
Obs. 46 46 46 46
Notes: The dependent variable is skilled-labor share of the wage bill (S1). w1/w2 is skilled-
unskilled wage premium, K/Y is capital-output ratio and Y is output. Robust standard errors are
given in parentheses. White’s heteroskedasticity correction was used. *** Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 at the 1% level. ** Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 5% level. * Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 at the 10% level.
Model 4 positive, but neither is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. It is for this reason that estimates
of γ1K in Models 1 and 2, and Models 3 and 4 are quite similar. Even though, the Adj. R2 statistic
is relatively high in all four models it is highest in Models 3 and 4 (0.62 and 0.63, respectively),
which could suggest that modiﬁcations of Models 1 and 2 to incorporate an output variable were
reasonable.
To summarize, the main ﬁnding here is that the baseline model and all three alternative models
obtain a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimate of γ1K, therefore providing evidence
in favor of the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis in the full sample of 46 countries.9
3.4 Estimation results from the OECD and non-OECD subsamples
A motivating factor in using the current dataset and testing approach was that they permit exami-
nation of the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis in subsamples of countries by using a reduced
form linear equation. As discussed previously, subsample estimation is currently impossible when
testing the hypothesis directly from the aggregate production function because it requires a large
9Results are qualitatively similar when we use the full Caselli-Colleman sample of 52 countries (see top panel of
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Table 2: Cross-country regressions for OECD and non-OECD subsamples
OECD
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.69070∗∗
(0.24782)
0.72150∗∗∗
(0.15901)
−1.21129
(0.96537)
−1.35479
(1.04928)
ln(w1/w2)0 .05196
(0.30553)
0.12475
(0.27602)
ln(K/Y )0 .11311
(0.19972)
0.09665
(0.16562)
−0.12046
(0.18415)
−0.08823
(0.20561)
lnY 0.21183∗
(0.10479)
0.21941∗
(0.11006)
s.e.e. 0.19332 0.19160 0.14376 0.14219
Adj. R2 0.01 0.02 0.22 0.20
Obs. 15 15 15 15
Non-OECD
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.40848∗∗∗
(0.05705)
0.42933∗∗∗
(0.03597)
−0.13039
(0.31291)
−0.39366
(0.35705)
ln(w1/w2)0 .05492
(0.11715)
0.17069
(0.12024)
ln(K/Y )0 .28296∗∗∗
(0.05998)
0.29017∗∗∗
(0.05700)
0.22734∗∗∗
(0.06477)
0.18241∗∗
(0.07113)
lnY 0.06680∗
(0.03706)
0.09051∗∗
(0.03987)
s.e.e. 0.37005 0.37345 0.33517 0.31189
Adj. R2 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.52
Obs. 31 31 31 31
Notes: The dependent variable is skilled-labor share of the wage bill (S1). w1/w2 is skilled-
unskilled wage premium, K/Y is capital-output ratio and Y is output. Robust standard errors are
given in parentheses. White’s heteroskedasticity correction was used. *** Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 at the 1% level. ** Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 5% level. * Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 at the 10% level.Nonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 10
number of observations. In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to two arbi-
trarily chosen nonoverlapping subsamples of our full sample of 46 countries. In particular, we are
interested in examining whether our ﬁndings are sensitive to splitting our full sample into OECD
and non-OECD subsamples.10
Regression estimates from the two subsamples are presented in Table 2. In the OECD sub-
sample, all four models obtain point estimates of γ1K that are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Interestingly, from all the relevant variables, only the coeﬃcient for Y is statistically signiﬁcant
(albeit marginally) and takes a positive value as in the full sample. In addition, notice that the
Adj. R2 statistic is very small in the models that do not include the output variable, e.g. Models
1a n d2 .
In contrast, in the non-OECD subsample, γ1K estimates vary from 0.18241 (Model 4) to 0.29017
(Model 2) and are signiﬁcant at the 5% level and 1% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is quite large in all
four models ranging from 0.45 to 0.52. Point estimates of coeﬃcients for w1/w2 are insigniﬁcantly
positive. Even though the coeﬃcient estimates for Y a r ep o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant in Models 3 and 4,
their magnitudes and signiﬁcance are a lot lower than in the full sample or the OECD subsample.11
The main ﬁnding from arbitrarily splitting our full sample into OECD and non-OECD subsam-
ples is that even though there is strong evidence in favor of capital-skill complementarity for the
non-OECD subsample, there is no evidence for the OECD subsample. This result has potentially
important implications for pinning down the primary determinants of wage inequality and economic
growth in the two groups of countries. We discuss some of these implications shortly.
3.5 Threshold estimation
Unlike the previous section in which we arbitrarily split the data into two subsamples, here we
follow Hansen (2000) to search for multiple regimes (endogenously determined subsamples) in the
data using the skilled-labor share equation (4).12 Hansen (2000) develops a statistical theory of
threshold estimation in the linear regression context that allows for cross-section observations.
Least squares estimation is considered, and an asymptotic distribution theory for the regression
10Here we follow the vast majority of cross-country empirical literature that arbitrarily splits the data into these
two subsamples. The OECD countries are marked with an asterisk in Table A1 in the appendix.
11Results are qualitatively similar when we use the full Caselli-Colleman sample of 52 countries (see middle and
lower panels of Table A2 in the appendix).
12Even though the threshold estimation analysis in this section is based on our basic speciﬁcation (Model 1), in
a subsequent section that is concerned with the robustness of these results, threshold estimation is done using the
alternative models (Models 2-4).Nonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 11
Figure 1: First sample split
estimates is developed. The main advantage of Hansen’s methodology over the regression-tree
model (i.e. Durlauf and Johnson (1995)) is that it is based on an asymptotic distribution theory
that can formally test the statistical signiﬁcance of regimes selected by the data.13 Following recent
papers on parameter heterogeneity in regression models, we search for multiple regimes in the data
using initial per capita output (y60) and initial adult literacy rates (LIT60) as potential threshold
variables.14
Since Hansen’s statistical theory allows for one threshold for each threshold variable, we proceed
by selecting between the two threshold variables using the heteroskedasticity-consistent Lagrange
Multiplier test for a threshold developed by Hansen (1996). In the ﬁrst round of splitting, it is
shown that the threshold model using LIT60 is signiﬁcant with p-value of 0.001, whereas y60 is
insigniﬁcant with p-value of 0.437. These results indicate that there exists a sample split based
on literacy rates. Figure 1 presents the normalized likelihood ratio sequence LR∗
n(γ) statistic as
a function of the output threshold. The least-squares estimate γ is the value that minimizes the
function LR∗
n(γ)w h i c ho c c u r sa tˆ γ = 68%. The asymptotic 95% critical value (7.35) is shown by
t h ed o t t e dl i n ea n dw h e r ei tc r o s s e sLR∗
n(γ) displays the conﬁdence set [63%,68%]. The LIT60
13For a detailed discussion of the statistical theory for threshold estimation in linear regressions, see Hansen (2000)
and Caner and Hansen (forthcoming).
14These two possible threshold variables are considered to be good proxies for initial endowment. We acknowledge
that other potential threshold variables can be used to further investigate nonlinearities in capital-skill complemen-
tarity. We leave this investigation for future research.Nonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 12
Figure 2: Second sample split
threshold variable divides our full sample of 46 countries into a low-literacy group (below 68%)
with 20 countries and a high-literacy group (above 68%) with 26 countries.
Further splitting of the high-literacy group is not possible according to the bootstrap test
statistic. However, we ﬁnd that further splitting of the low-literacy subsample (of 20 countries
with initial literacy rate below 68%) is possible. The threshold model using initial output (y60)i s
signiﬁcant attaining a p-value of 0.021.15 Figure 2 presents the normalized likelihood ratio statistic
as a function of the output threshold. The point estimate for the literacy threshold is ˆ γ = $2042
with the 95% conﬁdence interval [$1077,$2042]. The output threshold variable splits the low-
literacy subsample of 20 countries into two additional regimes; the low-literacy-low-output regime
with 12 countries and the low-literacy-high-output regime with 8 countries. No further splitting
was possible for the two regimes as bootstrap test statistics were insigniﬁcant.
Figure 3 presents a regression tree diagram that illustrates our threshold estimation results
obtained under the skilled-labor share equation (4). Non-terminal nodes are illustrated by squares
whereas terminal nodes are illustrated by circles. The numbers inside the squares and circles
show the number of countries in each node. The point estimates for each threshold variable are
presented on the rays connecting the nodes. As shown in Figure 3, the threshold analysis reveals
15Notice that in threshold models, sample spliting beyond the ﬁrst sample split is conditional on the previous
sample splits. Consequently, in our exercise, the second sample split (using y60) is conditional on the ﬁrst sample
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Figure 3: Regression tree obtained using thresohold estimation
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that there exist three regimes that obey diﬀerent statistical models with distinctly diﬀerent capital-
skill complementarities. Regime 1 contains countries with relatively high literacy rates (above 68%)
whereas Regime 3 contains countries with low literacy rates (below 68%) and low incomes (below
$2042). Finally Regime 2 consists of countries with quite low literacy rates (below 68%) but with
respectable per capital incomes (above $2042). Table 3 presents the countries in each regime
obtained from our threshold estimation.
3.6 Estimation results from the three regimes
To further investigate the nonlinearity in capital-skill complementarity across countries obtained
from the Hansen (2000) endogenous threshold methodology, we turn attention to estimation of
the regression coeﬃcients of equation (4) for the three regimes. Table 4 presents these coeﬃcient
estimates.
Notice that estimates vary extensively in magnitude and signiﬁcance across regimes, therefore
providing strong support in favor of parameter heterogeneity and the presence of multiple regimes.
For example, in Model 1, point estimates of γ1K vary from 0.14073 (signiﬁcant at the 5% level)Nonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 14
Table 3: Country classiﬁcation
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Argentina Nicaragua Colombia Bolivia
Australia Panama Ecuador Brazil
Canada Paraguay Guatemala Dom. Rep.
Chile Philippines Malaysia El Salvador
Costa Rica S. Korea Mexico Ghana
France Singapore Peru Honduras
Greece Sri Lanka Portugal India
Hong Kong Sweden Venezuela Indonesia
Israel Switzerland Kenya
Italy U.K. Pakistan
Jamaica U.S.A. Thailand
Japan Uruguay Tunisia
Netherlands W. Germany
(26) (8) (12)
in Regime 3, to 0.37026 (signiﬁcant at the 1% level) in Regime 2. In addition, point estimates of
coeﬃcients for ln(w1/w2)v a r yf r o m−0.02802 (not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero) in Regime 1,
to 0.58133 (signiﬁcant at the 1% level) in Regime 2. Substantial variation of parameters across the
three regimes is also evident in Models 2-4.
More importantly, our results reveal that capital-skill complementarity is more pronounced in
Regime 2 (middle-income low-education subsample), than in Regime 1 (high education subsample)
or Regime 3 (low-income low-education subsample). In particular, in Model 1 coeﬃcient estimates
of γ1K are 0.21015 and 0.14073 (and signiﬁcant at the 5% level) in Regimes 1 and 3, respectively,
whereas in Regime 2 is 0.37026 (signiﬁcant at the 1% level). Robustness analysis of our baseline
Model 1 shows that our result is indeed reinforced when we consider the alternative Models 2-4.
For example, in Models 3-4 (that include Y )t h er e l e v a n tc o e ﬃcient γ1K becomes insigniﬁcant
for Regime 1 and marginally signiﬁcant for Regime 3, whereas it is ampliﬁed in magnitude and
remains highly signiﬁcant for Regime 2. Every model considered here shares the same nonlinearity
in capital-skill complementarity with Regime 2 experiencing the most pronounced eﬀect.
A few other points are worth noting. First, in all but one model (Model 1 in Regime 1) the
coeﬃcient for w1/w2 is positive and signiﬁcant providing evidence that the elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled labor is less than unity, and therefore quite complementary. Second,
inclusion of Y in our baseline model enters positively signiﬁcant only in Regime 1 (see Models 3-4).Nonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 15
Table 4: Cross-country regressions for the three regimes
Cross-country regressions for Regime 1
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.60515∗∗∗
(0.08873)
0.59562∗∗∗
(0.07664)
−0.20956
(0.31882)
−0.79783∗
(0.42407)
ln(w1/w2) −0.02802
(0.12269)
0.26924∗
(0.13562)
ln(K/Y )0 .21015∗∗
(0.09003)
0.20950∗∗
(0.08830)
0.07775
(0.09458)
−0.00919
(0.09989)
lnY 0.09458∗∗
(0.03656)
0.15293∗∗∗
(0.04552)
s.e.e. 0.35734 0.35834 0.27940 0.24079
Adj. R2 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.41
Obs. 26 26 26 26
Cross-country regressions for Regime 2
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.09491
(0.12019)
0.46748∗∗∗
(0.05099)
0.83075
(0.67219)
0.58137
(0.38798)
ln(w1/w2)0 .58133∗∗∗
(0.18062)
0.60174∗∗
(0.17191)
ln(K/Y )0 .37026∗∗∗
(0.06589)
0.21045∗∗∗
(0.06893)
0.22678∗∗
(0.07851)
0.39833∗∗∗
(0.06615)
lnY −0.04041
(0.07453)
−0.05556
(0.04243)
s.e.e. 0.00640 0.01857 0.01757 0.00465
Adj. R2 0.80 0.51 0.49 0.83
O b s . 8888
Cross-country regressions for Regime 3
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.27942∗∗∗
(0.05522)
0.39655∗∗∗
(0.03180)
0.41730
(0.45210)
0.08836
(0.39736)
ln(w1/w2)0 .29561∗∗
(0.12496)
0.31099∗∗
(0.13484)
ln(K/Y )0 .14073∗∗
(0.06196)
0.19574∗∗
(0.07420)
0.19769∗
(0.08559)
0.12049
(0.07741)
lnY −0.00252
(0.05490)
0.02251
(0.04633)
s.e.e. 0.04080 0.07218 0.06490 0.03936
Adj. R2 0.57 0.27 0.34 0.55
Obs. 12 12 12 12
Notes: The dependent variable is skilled-labor share of the wage bill (S1). w1/w2 is skilled-
unskilled wage premium, K/Y is capital-output ratio and Y is output. Robust standard errors are
given in parentheses. White’s heteroskedasticity correction was used. *** Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 at the 1% level. ** Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 5% level. * Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
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Table 5: J test: Model 1 vs. Model 3
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 3
Test Statistic
(p-value)
4.00877
(0.00020)
−1.59141
(0.11900)
Notes: Models 1 and 3 are the only two non-nested models. Bold values
indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
This may suggest that the production function in developed countries is non-homothetic. Third, the
Adj. R2 statistic is the highest for models in Regime 2, and lowest for models in Regime 1. This may
suggest that our proposed models for testing the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis better ﬁt
the experience of developing countries than that of developed countries. Finally, a qualiﬁcation is
in place here. Even though we use bootstrap techniques to account for estimation in small samples,
our results should be interpreted with some caution since ultimately we use these small samples to
provide guidance to economic theories.16
4 Robustness
In this section we examine the robustness of the results to alternative functional forms. In ad-
dition to testing the robustness of our empirical ﬁndings using diﬀerent linear and nonlinear re-
gression model speciﬁcations, we have also reconsidered our ﬁndings for alternative subsamples of
countries.17
4.1 Alternative functional forms
We start by employing econometric tests for non-nested linear regression model selection (J-type
tests), and functional form (RESET tests).
J tests for non-nested linear regression models
A careful look at the results from the whole sample in Table 1, reveals that Model 3 possibly
dominates Model 1. Given that Models 1 and 3 are non-nested we can more formally test this
16In the next section, we also consider two rather than three regimes obtained after the ﬁrst split. In this case,
Regimes 2 and 3 are merged which increases the sample size to 20 observations.
17We are grateful to an anonymous referee for extremely valuable comments on robustness analyses of our baseline
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assertion, by employing a J test for non-nested linear regression models.18 T h eT e s tS t a t i s t i cf o r
Model i is the t-statistic of ﬁtted dependent variables from Model j,w h e r ei,j =1 ,3. We reject
Model i if the Test Statistic for Model i is signiﬁcant.
Results from such test appear in Table 5. The J test performed on the full sample of 46 countries
does not reject Model 3 but rejects Model 1. Thus consistent with our assertion, Model 3 dominates
Model 1 indicating that including lnY and excluding ln(w1/w2)i m p r o v e st h eﬁt of the estimated
speciﬁcation.
RESET tests for functional form
In this section we perform RESET tests for functional form of our estimated equations. In partic-
ular, we add nonlinear (quadratic and cubic functions) functions of ln(K/Y )a n dl n Y in all four
models considered in our baseline estimation. These tests are motivated from the observation that
the addition of lnY improves considerably the ﬁt of these equations. This in turn implies that
lnK and lnY may not share the same coeﬃcient or that the ln(K/Y ) term enters nonlinearly.
For clarity and ease of exposition, we report RESET test results only for Model 3 in the main
text. These results are presented in Table 6. RESET test results for Models 1, 2 and 4 are presented
in Tables A3, A4 and A5, respectively, in the appendix. The Null Hypothesis is that additional
variables of the Speciﬁed Model jointly equal to zero. p-values (in parentheses) in bold indicate
signiﬁcance at the 5% level. To reduce the computational cost associated with bootstrapping in
the numerous speciﬁcations considered in the robustness analysis, we do not report robust standard
errors but instead p-values for normal distributions. Experimentation with the bootstrap revealed
that the robust and normal standard errors were very similar.
The RESET tests for functional form indicate that adding the nonlinear terms ln(K/Y )]2,
[ln(K/Y )]3,( l nY )2,( l nY )3, and combinations thereof, to our original set of explanatory variables,
does not improve the signiﬁcance of Models 3 and 4 (see RESET test results in Tables 6 and A5,
respectively). In contrast, these tests show that the nonlinear terms improve Model 1 and Model
2s i g n i ﬁcantly (see RESET test results in Tables A3 and A4, respectively, in the appendix). In
general, however, Model 4 is shown to dominate both Model 1 and Model 2 (see second row of
Table A3 and fourth row of Table A4, respectively), Model 3 dominates Model 2 (see third row of
Table A4), implying potential non-homotheticity of the production function.19 Finally, comparing
18Notice that out of the four models considered only Models 1 and 3 are non-nested.
19RESET tests can not compare Model 1 and Model 3. Recall, however, that using a J test we have shown thatNonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 18
Table 6: RESET tests: Model 3 vs. speciﬁed model
Speciﬁcation Test Statistic
(p-value)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY [Model 4] 2.77201
(0.10337)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,ln[(K/Y )]2 1.64175
(0.20612)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2 2.29676
(0.11339)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )3 2.32786
(0.11026)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2 1.49528
(0.23047)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3 1.25999
(0.30106)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3 1.50949
(0.22677)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )3 1.51510
(0.22532)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,(lnY )3 1.68552
(0.18547)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,lnY,ln[(K/Y )]3 1.22148
(0.31740)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2,(lnY )3 1.23698
(0.31116)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 1.24182
(0.30924)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 1.25158
(0.30539)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 1.22497
(0.31641)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2 0.28851
(0.59401)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2 0.97930
(0.32804)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )3 1.02055
(0.31817)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2 0.47822
(0.62330)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3 0.35046
(0.70645)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3 0.50121
(0.60946)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )3 0.49820
(0.61126)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,(lnY )3 0.73024
(0.48795)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2,(lnY )3 0.47733
(0.69985)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3 0.43334
(0.73029)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 0.45079
(0.71814)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 0.49941
(0.68481)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 0.59577
(0.66781)
Notes: The Null Hypothesis is that additional variables of Speciﬁe dM o d e lj o i n t l ye q u a lt o0 .
The dependent variable is skilled-labor share of the wage bill (S1). All of the speciﬁcations above
were run with a constant. p-values are given in parentheses. Bold values indicate signiﬁcance at
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Models 3 and 4 by looking at the results in Table 1 does not provide a clear answer as to which
of the two models is more appropriate for our full sample estimation. More speciﬁcally, although
the Adj. R2 is slightly higher for Model 4 than Model 3, the coeﬃcient for ln(w1/w2)i nM o d e l
4 is insigniﬁcant, although marginally as the p-value is only slightly over 0.10 which. This is also
conﬁrmed by the RESET tests (see second row of Table 6).
In summary, our econometric tests for functional form provide support for speciﬁcations that
include the term lnY (Models 3 and 4) implying potential non-homotheticity of the production
function. In addition, RESET test results show that the inclusion of nonlinear terms, such as (lnY )2
and [ln(K/Y )]2, do not improve signiﬁcantly these preferred speciﬁcations. This would suggest
that the nonlinearity in capital-skill complementarity is not due to the aggregate speciﬁcation but
rather due to parameter heterogeneity. Put diﬀerently, the nonlinearity is due to diﬀerent regimes
of countries obeying diﬀerent statistical models.
4.2 Alternative subsamples
Next, we test for subsample structural diﬀerences (Chow-type tests), and perform threshold esti-
mation using alternative models to our basic speciﬁcation (Model 1).
Threshold estimation using alternative models
This section examines the robustness of our baseline threshold results by considering alternative
subsamples and models. Given the small number of observations in Regimes 2 and 3 (8 and 12,
respectively), we re-estimate Models 1-4 in section 3.6 after only the ﬁrst round of splitting based
on literacy rates. This obtains Regime 1 with high literacy rates (above 68%; 26 countries) and the
combination of Regimes 2 and 3 (call it Regime 2a) with low literacy rates (below 68%; 20countries).
Since we have already described results for Regime 1 (see upper panel of Table 3) we focus attention
to coeﬃcient estimates for the new Regime 2a presented in Table 7.
For Regime 2a point estimates of coeﬃcients on ln(w1/w2) in Model 1 and Model 4 are signiﬁ-
cantly positive at 5%. More importantly, the estimate of γ1K is signiﬁcantly positive at 1% in all
models, ranging from 0.21217 in Model 4 to 0.25156 in Model 1, thus providing strong evidence of
capital-skill complementarity. Although these estimates are quite close to those in Models 1 and 2
for Regime 1, Chow tests (see below) reject no structural change between Regime 1 and Regime 2a
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Table 7: Cross-country regressions for Regime 2a (consisting of Regimes 2&3)
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.29245∗∗∗
(0.05341)
0.40084∗∗∗
(0.02734)
0.14665
(0.31765)
−0.01389
(0.29299)
ln(w1/w2)0 .24797∗∗
(0.10929)
0.25739∗∗
(0.10977)
ln(K/Y )0 .25156∗∗∗
(0.04196)
0.25774∗∗∗
(0.04766)
0.22477∗∗∗
(0.06223)
0.21217∗∗∗
(0.05596)
lnY 0.03066
(0.03816)
0.03645
(0.03424)
s.e.e. 0.08201 0.11115 0.10145 0.07682
Adj. R2 0.68 0.56 0.60 0.69
Obs. 20 20 20 20
Notes: The dependent variable is skilled-labor share of the wage bill (S1). w1/w2 is skilled-
unskilled wage premium, K/Y is capital-output ratio and Y is output. Robust standard errors are
given in parentheses. White’s heteroskedasticity correction was used. *** Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 at the 1% level. ** Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 5% level. * Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 at the 10% level.
for all models. Finally, notice that Adj. R2 is relatively higher for models not including ln(w1/w2);
namely 0.68 in Model 1 and 0.69 in Model 4.
Next, we examine the robustness of our threshold results by considering in addition to our basic
speciﬁcation (Model 1), the alternative speciﬁcations (Models 3 and 4) favored by our functional
form tests presented above. The key ﬁnding here is that regardless of whether we use Model 3 or
Model 4 we obtain the same terminal literacy threshold of 65% that is very close to the literacy
threshold of 68% obtained using Model 1. The high-literacy regime now includes 28 countries
(call this Regime 1b) whereas the low-literacy regime includes 18 countries (call this Regime 2b).
Ecuador and Thailand are the two countries that move out from the low and into the high literacy
regime.
Results from this exercise are presented in Table 8. One can readily verify that coeﬃcient
estimates are very similar to those in the upper panel of Table 3 for Regime 1, and Table 7 for
Regime 2a. In our threshold estimation robustness analysis, we have also considered all four models
with the nonlinear terms (lnY )2 and [ln(K/Y )]2. Results varied slightly with estimation but the
terminal threshold variable was always literacy of 65% or 68% consistent with our previous results.20
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Table 8: Cross-country regressions for two alternative regimes
Cross-country regressions for Regime 1b
Speciﬁc a t i o n M o d e l1 M o d e l2 M o d e l3 M o d e l4
Constant 0.58103∗∗∗
(0.08341)
0.57057∗∗∗
(0.07012)
−0.23594
(0.29880)
−0.81613∗
(0.39968)
ln(w1/w2) −0.02904
(0.12090)
0.26999∗
(0.13146)
ln(K/Y )0 .22988∗∗∗
(0.08326)
0.22977∗∗∗
(0.08188)
0.09673
(0.08775)
−0.01521
(0.09236)
lnY 0.09523∗∗∗
(0.03459)
0.15232∗∗∗
(0.04298)
s.e.e. 0.38214 0.38387 0.29028 0.24806
Adj. R2 0.21 0.21 0.38 0.46
Obs. 28 28 28 28
Cross-country regressions for Regime 2b
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.29171∗∗∗
(0.05368)
0.40043∗∗∗
(0.02751)
0.09663
(0.32118)
−0.07265
(0.28980)
ln(w1/w2)0 .24882∗∗
(0.10884)
0.25983∗∗
(0.10780)
ln(K/Y )0 .23646∗∗∗
(0.04391)
0.24423∗∗∗
(0.04917)
0.20324∗∗∗
(0.06588)
0.18755∗∗∗
(0.05793)
lnY 0.03667
(0.03862)
0.04340
(0.03391)
s.e.e. 0.07204 0.09499 0.09017 0.06493
Adj. R2 0.66 0.57 0.58 0.68
Obs. 18 18 18 18
Notes: The dependent variable is skilled-labor share of the wage bill (S1). w1/w2 is skilled-
unskilled wage premium, K/Y is capital-output ratio and Y is output. Robust standard errors are
given in parentheses. White’s heteroskedasticity correction was used. *** Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 at the 1% level. ** Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 5% level. * Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
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Table 9: Chow tests
OECD and non-OECD
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Test Statistic
(p-value)
2.84171
(0.04983)
4.42299
(0.01807)
1.50363
(0.22829)
0.93665
(0.45319)
Regimes 1, 2 and 3
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Test Statistic
(p-value)
4.25145
(0.00236)
8.90347
(0.00003)
1.15138
(0.35289)
3.19421
(0.00822)
Regimes 1 and 2a
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Test Statistic
(p-value)
7.40761
(0.00046)
9.59760
(0.00037)
5.32458
(0.00350)
5.42105
(0.00149)
Notes: Top panel null hypothesis: OECD and non-OECD structurally not diﬀerent. Middle panel
null hypothesis: Regimes 1, 2 and 3 structurally not diﬀerent. Bottom panel null hypothesis:
Regimes 1 and 2&3 combined structurally not diﬀerent. Bold values indicates rejection of the
null at the 5% level. Regime 2a is Regimes 2 and 3 combined.
Chow tests for structural change
Finally, we perform Chow tests to examine whether our arbitrarily chosen subsamples (OECD and
non-OECD) and endogenously determined regimes (Regimes 1, 2 and 3) are structurally diﬀerent
from each other. Results from these robustness analyses are presented in Table 9.
The top panel of Table 9 presents test results for structural change between OECD and non-
OECD countries. The Chow test rejects no structural change if we use Models 1 and 2 but does
not reject if we use Models 3 and 4. This indicates that for the preferred Models 3 and 4 we should
not have trivially split our full sample into OECD and non-OECD. This result is consistent with
our subsequent search for endogenous splitting of the full sample into regimes that obey diﬀerent
statistical models.
We have also tested for structural change between the three diﬀerent endogenously determined
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structural change in the three regimes. The Chow test rejects no structural change if we use
Models 1, 2 and 4 but it does not reject if we use Model 3. The justiﬁcation could be that for
Model 3 the signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients is quite low in all four models, thus rendering regimes not
be structurally diﬀerent. The bottom panel of Table 9 presents Chow test results for Regime 1
and Regime 2a (combining Regimes 2 and 3). It is clearly shown that all four models reject no
structural change. This is quite important for the robustness analysis using diﬀerent threshold
models presented in the previous section.
In summary, the extensive robustness analyses concerning alternative threshold models and
subsamples shows that, consistent with our baseline results, there is strong evidence of nonlinearities
in capital-kill complementarity.
5 Discussion
Our main results can be summarized as follows: First, in the full sample we ﬁnd evidence in
favor of capital-skill complementarity in all four models considered. Second, when we arbitrarily
split our full sample into OECD and non-OECD subsamples, we ﬁnd that the null of capital-
skill complementarity hypothesis is rejected in the OECD subsample, but is not rejected in the
non-OECD subsample. Third, when we employ Hansen’s (2000) data-sorting methodology we
ﬁnd evidence in favor of nonlinearities in capital-skill complementarity and the presence of three
regimes that obey distinctly diﬀerent statistical models. An extensive sensitivity analysis shows
that in general these results are quite robust to a battery of econometric tests, alternative testable
speciﬁcations and threshold models.
What are the implications of these results to the existing literature? Our ﬁrst result (on the
full sample) is qualitatively consistent with but a lot stronger than Duﬀy, Papageorgiou and Perez-
Sebastian (2004) who ﬁnd some (albeit weak) evidence in favor of capital-skill complementarity
using a panel dataset of 73 countries over the period 1965-1990. Perhaps this is due to data
diﬀerences, as we use cross-sectional data and they use panel data, but most likely our stronger
results are due to estimation. In particular, the nature of our dataset (cross-sectional) permits use
of linear reduced form regression equations to test the hypothesis, whereas their dataset (panel) is
used for nonlinear estimation of aggregate production function parameters. As Duﬀy, Papageorgiou
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substitution) directly from a highly nonlinear aggregate production function (such as a two-level
CES function) is quite diﬃcult and may result in imprecise estimates.
Our second result (on the OECD and non-OECD subsamples) suggests that there is no evidence
in favor of capital-skill complementarity for the OECD subsample. This is relevant to the recent lit-
erature which tries to explain the rising wage and income inequality in the U.S. and other developed
countries due solely to capital-skill complementarity (see, e.g. Krusell et al. (2000)). Our ﬁnding
points to alternative explanations for rising wage and income inequality in OECD countries, for
example, skill-biased technological change as recently argued by Ruiz-Arranz (2002). In addition,
our second result suggests that capital is highly complementary to skilled labor in the non-OECD
subsample. This maybe because, unlike the OECD countries in which skill is more complementarity
to technology, in the non-OECD countries skill is more productive when it complements capital
(that presumably is more accessible than technology).
Our ﬁnal result is perhaps the most striking. We ﬁnd that capital-skill complementarity is a phe-
nomenon that does not share equal support across countries. In particular, we ﬁnd that in Regime
2 (8 middle-income-low-literacy countries) exhibits substantially higher level of capital-skill com-
plementarity than Regime 3 (12 low-income-low-literacy countries) and Regime 1 (26 high-literacy
countries). The parameter heterogeneity evident in our cross-country regressions and the result-
ing nonlinearity in the development process regarding the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis
relates to and is consistent with the parameter heterogeneity found in cross-country growth regres-
sions (see e.g., Liu and Stengos (1999), Durlauf (2001), and Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001)). More
importantly, this ﬁnding is qualitatively consistent with Goldin and Katz who show that, in the
U.S. manufacturing, capital-skill complementarity was at least as large for the period 1909-1919 as
for the period 1979-1989 and signiﬁcantly larger than for the period 1959-1979 (see Goldin and Katz
(1998, pp. 722-723)). Both ours and Goldin and Katz’s results suggest that it maybe misleading to
think of capital-skill complementarity as a universal phenomenon. In contrast, our results suggest
that the complementarity between capital and labor may vary across time and countries.
Extensive robustness analyses were performed focusing primarily on alternative functional forms
of the baseline speciﬁcation, and alternative subsamples of countries. These analyses obtained the
following two main results: First, our baseline empirical ﬁndings were shown to be quite robust to
alternative functional forms and subsamples obtained from alternative threshold models. Second,
the robustness results suggest that the nonlinearity in capital-skill complementarity is not due toNonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 25
the aggregate speciﬁcation but due to parameter heterogeneity. That is, the nonlinearity is due to
parameters of our linear regression speciﬁcations not being constant across countries.
A clear message from our ﬁndings is that to further understand the behavior of the nonlinear
relationship between capital-skill complementarity and the development process, a theory is needed.
Here we suggest a model in which capital-skill complementarity nonlinearities, of the sort obtained
in this paper, are the endogenous outcome of the economic system. Assume that the world consists
of low, middle and high-income countries. A social planner chooses how to use physical capital,
technology, and skilled and unskilled labor to maximize agents’ utility function. Assume that
poor countries are poorly educated and rich countries are well-educated. Poor countries choose
to allocate their scare stock of capital to complement their abundant stock of unskilled labor,
therefore rendering capital-skill complementarity a second-order phenomenon. On the other hand,
rich countries, which have wide access to technology, choose to allocate most of their plentiful
skilled labor to the technology sector, also rendering capital-skill complementarity a second-order
phenomenon. Where capital-skill complementarity is most pronounced is in the middle-income
countries with some skilled labor. Assuming that in these countries physical capital stock is more
abundant than technology, then it is more productive to allocate their scarce skilled labor to
complement physical capital.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have used a novel dataset to test Griliches’ capital-skill complementarity hypothesis
in a cross-section of countries. Our main result is threefold: First we ﬁnd evidence in favor of the
hypothesis in our full sample of 46 countries. Second, when we arbitrarily split the data into OECD
and non-OECD subsamples, we ﬁnd that the hypothesis is not supported for the OECD countries
but strongly supported for the non-OECD countries. Third, using Hansen’s (2000) data-splitting
methodology we ﬁnd evidence in favor of parameter heterogeneity and nonlinearities in capital-skill
complementarity. In particular, we ﬁnd that capital-skill complementarity is most pronounced in
middle-income countries. These results are quite robust to a range of sensitivity analyses.
Our ﬁndings call for further investigation of capital-skill complementarity, as empirical support
of the hypothesis would have important implications in specifying the aggregate production function
and therefore in re-evaluating existing empirical and theoretical ﬁndings. Beyond the possibleNonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 26
nonlinearity in capital-skill complementarity across the development process, equally intriguing
is the possible nonlinearity of the phenomenon in the short run and the long run. The idea,
originally explored in Galor and Moav (2000) and Galor and Weil (2000), is that capital may
beneﬁt skilled labor in the short run due to the comparative advantage of educated individuals
to cope with a changing technological environment. This eﬀect may occur regardless of whether
in the long run capital is skilled-biased or unskilled-biased. Even though the dataset used here is
not ﬁt to distinguish between short run and long run, it would be a real advancement if future
work could take on this issue. Finally, this paper was a ﬁrst attempt towards understanding how
pronounced capital-skill complementarity is in diﬀerent groups of countries. Future work focused
on the magnitude of the complementarity between skilled labor and capital will shed new light on
the evolution of distributive shares, a central component of policy analysis.Nonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 27
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Appendix
We follow Brown and Christensen (1981) in deriving the skilled-labor share equation of a quasi-
ﬁxed cost function. Assume that output (Y ) is produced using capital (K), which is a quasi-ﬁxed
factor, and skilled labor (L1) and unskilled labor (L2), which are variable factors. Then the translog
variable cost function is deﬁned as
lnCv = α0 + α1 lnw1 + α2 lnw2 + αK lnK + αY lnY +
1/2(γ11 lnw2
1 + γ12 lnw1 lnw2 + γ21 lnw2 lnw1 + γ22 lnw2
2)+
1/2γKK(lnK)2 +1 /2γYY(lnY )2 + γ1K lnw1 lnK + γ2K lnw2 lnK +
γ1Y lnw1 lnY + γ2Y lnw2 lnY + γKY lnK lnY, (A1)
where Cv denotes the variable cost, w1 is the price of skilled labor, and w2 is the price of unskilled
labor.
Assuming cost minimizing price taking behavior, the conditional demand of variable inputs (Li,
where i =1 ,2) can be written by the Shepard’s lemma as
Li =
∂Cv
∂wi
. (A2)
It then follows that the share of the ith input, Li, in the variable cost function is deﬁned (using
A2) as
Si =
wiLi
Cv =
1
C
∂Cv
∂wi
1
wi
=
∂ lnCv
∂ lnwi
. (A3)
Using equations (A1) and (A3) yields the share of skilled labor in the variable cost function as
S1 = α1 + γ11 lnw1 + γ12 lnw2 + γ1K lnK + γ1Y lnY. (A4)
Finally, we make the following two theoretical assumptions: First, we impose linear homogeneity
in input prices which means that for a ﬁxed level of output total cost increases proportionally
when all prices increase proportionally. This assumption implies the following linear restrictions:
α1 + α2 =1 ,γ11 + γ21 = γ11 + γ12 = γ12 + γ22 = γ21 + γ22 =0 ,γ1Y + γ2Y = γ1K + γ2K =0 .
Second, we impose constant returns to scale to the production function which implies the following
additional restrictions: αK + αY =0 ,γ1K + γ1Y = γ2K + γ2Y =0 ,γKK + γKY = γKY + γYY =0 .
The imposition of linear homogeneity in input prices and constant returns to scale in equation (A1)
yields the estimation equation (4) in the main text for the skilled labor share of total labor costs
S1 = α1 + γ11 ln(w1/w2)+γ1K ln(K/Y ).Nonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 31
Table A1: Values of relevant variables (52 countries)
Country Regression Equation Variables Threshold Var.
(Y/L)88 (K/L)88 L1 L2 w1/w2 S1 (Y/L)60 (Lit.)60
Argentina 14804.7 33151.4 106.45 59.90 1.51 0.729 4852 91
Australia* 29858.1 88075.5 128.79 17.08 1.24 0.903 8440 100
Bolivia 4952.5 9076.4 50.74 74.91 1.33 0.474 1618 39
Botswana† 3315.8 9884.9 40.73 115.07 2.15 0.432 ––
Brazil 11297.0 21226.6 61.97 99.61 1.80 0.528 1842 61
Canada* 33336.9 82442.8 133.70 7.04 1.23 0.959 10286 99
Chile 9323.1 22451.9 107.74 72.64 1.62 0.706 5189 84
China† 2123.7 4156.4 49.85 64.89 1.22 0.484 ––
Colombia 9360.2 15433.7 76.09 83.39 1.75 0.615 2672 63
Costa Rica 9118.2 16695.3 76.78 82.61 1.55 0.590 3360 90
Cyprus† 15804.7 37046.2 143.77 47.87 1.55 0.823 ––
Dom. Rep. 7314.3 12231.8 48.74 84.97 1.46 0.456 1939 65
Ecuador 8388.1 21190.1 106.87 68.52 1.60 0.714 2198 68
El Salvador 5548.5 5617.3 38.05 92.26 1.47 0.377 2042 49
France* 28971.6 84929.0 111.70 45.53 1.49 0.785 7215 99
Ghana 1853.9 1217.9 35.24 83.85 1.40 0.370 1009 27
Greece* 16607.3 42802.4 85.39 26.54 1.11 0.781 2257 81
Guatemala 7430.5 7772.6 43.36 98.19 1.81 0.444 2481 32
Honduras 4596.5 6174.7 74.94 102.17 2.02 0.597 1430 45
Hong Kong 21532.3 29127.6 98.99 38.21 1.28 0.768 3085 70
Hungary*† 10868.9 33857.0 88.94 37.43 1.19 0.739 ––
India 3045.7 3775.5 34.47 79.29 1.22 0.347 978 28
Indonesia 3914.3 8083.8 72.29 84.62 1.97 0.627 879 39
Israel 23362.3 51767.6 118.69 36.53 1.29 0.807 4802 84
Italy* 29552.4 82317.6 66.22 42.94 1.10 0.629 4913 91
Jamaica 4595.5 12830.9 184.72 96.17 3.16 0.859 2726 82
Japan* 20807.3 64180.8 119.16 27.87 1.30 0.848 3493 98
Kenya 1997.8 2748.3 34.46 108.77 1.93 0.379 944 20
Malaysia 9471.6 23542.7 81.76 58.80 1.46 0.670 2154 53
Mexico* 15329.6 28448.8 92.07 81.22 1.76 0.666 4229 65
Netherlands* 28549.7 79069.3 127.68 24.43 1.34 0.875 7689 99
Nicaragua 4452.8 8762.3 40.19 90.85 1.47 0.394 3195 90
Pakistan 4551.6 3793.2 30.24 85.09 1.47 0.343 1077 15
Panama 7897.9 19793.9 139.12 63.30 1.73 0.792 2423 73
Paraguay 6015.4 9689.0 67.70 87.77 1.58 0.549 1951 75
Peru 8386.6 18075.5 75.06 65.24 1.38 0.614 3310 61
Philippines 4472.8 8042.3 96.98 46.46 1.38 0.742 1668 72
Poland*† 8438.8 33948.8 98.10 19.50 1.12 0.849 ––
Portugal* 12960.5 29436.8 59.47 63.82 1.49 0.581 2272 62
S. Korea* 13483.3 24650.9 159.26 28.46 1.53 0.895 1285 71
Singapore 21470.4 56218.5 89.34 71.33 1.71 0.682 2793 83
Sri Lanka 5476.3 5919.5 75.99 51.12 1.32 0.662 1794 75
Sweden* 27886.0 72777.3 132.60 28.28 1.31 0.860 7802 99
Switzerland* 30964.9 107869.8 142.18 22.21 1.37 0.898 10308 99
Taiwan† 15787.3 26240.0 96.91 35.82 1.27 0.775 ––
Thailand 5557.7 7477.4 64.52 86.78 1.52 0.531 1308 68
Tunisia 7695.7 10823.4 35.73 82.32 1.38 0.375 1623 16
U.K.* 25775.3 50408.8 115.32 36.38 1.31 0.806 7634 99
U.S.A.* 35438.7 87330.1 228.61 6.33 1.48 0.982 12362 98
Uruguay 12036.3 23397.6 96.67 62.49 1.47 0.695 5119 94
Venezuela 17529.1 42713.1 70.71 69.46 1.40 0.588 10367 63
W. Germany* 28992.2 89368.2 93.70 41.19 1.22 0.735 7695 99
Notes: ∗ OECD members. † Countries excluded from the Caselli-Coleman sample.Nonlinearities in Capital-Skill Complementarity 32
Table A2: Regressions for full sample (52 countries), OECD and non-OECD subsamples
Full Sample
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.47952∗∗∗
(0.05761)
0.44404∗∗∗
(0.03897)
−0.54935∗∗∗
(0.19631)
−0.66979∗∗∗
(0.23007)
ln(w1/w2) −0.08304
(0.09936)
0.08843
(0.08813)
ln(K/Y )0 .30904∗∗∗
(0.05000)
0.31369∗∗∗
(0.04965)
0.16923∗∗∗
(0.04930)
0.16211∗∗∗
(0.04994)
lnY 0.11844∗∗∗
(0.02310)
0.12830∗∗∗
(0.02512)
s.e.e. 0.87538 0.89215 0.58183 0.57301
Adj. R2 0.43 0.43 0.62 0.62
Obs. 52 52 52 52
OECD
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.68818∗∗∗
(0.22415)
0.73457∗∗∗
(0.13233)
−0.19106
(0.62456)
−0.23115
(0.66551)
ln(w1/w2)0 .07420
(0.28361)
0.06873
(0.27161)
ln(K/Y )0 .10461
(0.16989)
0.07819
(0.13211)
0.08148
(0.12613)
0.10600
(0.16268)
lnY 0.09248
(0.06118)
0.09219
(0.06329)
s.e.e. 0.19728 0.19822 0.16968 0.16874
Adj. R2 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.12
Obs. 17 17 17 17
Non-OECD
Speciﬁcation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.45903∗∗∗
(0.05982)
0.45071∗∗∗
(0.04029)
−0.45256
(0.26478)
∗ −0.59520∗
(0.29747)
ln(w1/w2) −0.02343
(0.12297)
0.11834
(0.11195)
ln(K/Y )0 .25254∗∗∗
(0.06552)
0.24874∗∗∗
(0.06160)
0.17036∗∗∗
(0.05828)
0.14198∗∗
(0.06399)
lnY 0.10675∗∗∗
(0.03107)
0.11868∗∗∗
(0.03307)
s.e.e. 0.54775 00.54905 .40064 0.38718
Adj. R2 0.31 0.31 0.49 0.49
Obs. 35 35 35 35
Notes: The dependent variable is skilled-labor share of the wage bill (S1). w1/w2 is skilled-
unskilled wage premium, K/Y is capital-output ratio and Y is output. Robust standard errors are
given in parentheses. White’s heteroskedasticity correction was used. *** Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 at the 1% level. ** Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 5% level. * Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
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Table A3: Model 1 vs. Speciﬁed Model
Speciﬁcation Test Statistic
(p-value)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY [Model 4] 15.84263
(0.00027)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),[ln(K/Y )]2 0.78134
(0.38176)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),(lnY )2 16.78205
(0.00019)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),(lnY )3 17.52808
(0.00014)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3 0.40062
(0.67250)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )3 8.69431
(0.00071)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2 8.10575
(0.00108)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2 8.95198
(0.00059)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )3 8.99211
(0.00058)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2 5.82430
(0.00212)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3 5.52032
(0.00287)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3 5.84266
(0.00208)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )3 5.84992
(0.00207)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,(lnY )3 6.07009
(0.00166)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 5.90825
(0.00195)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3 4.42447
(0.00480)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2,(lnY )3 4.44450
(0.04102)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 4.45074
(0.00465)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 4.46336
(0.00458)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 3.80130
(0.01054)
Notes: The Null Hypothesis is that additional variables of Speciﬁe dM o d e lj o i n t l ye q u a lt o0 .
The dependent variable is skilled-labor share of the wage bill (S1). All of the speciﬁcations above
were run with a constant. p-values are given in parentheses. Bold values indicate signiﬁcance at
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Table A4: Model 2 vs. Speciﬁed Model
Speciﬁcation Test Statistic
(p-value)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y )[ M o d e l1 ] 0 .14429
(0.70593)
ln(K/Y ),lnY [Model 3] 12.73972
(0.00090)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY [Model 4] 8.01836
(0.00112)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),[ln(K/Y )]2 0.46244
(0.63291)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),(lnY )2 8.48965
(0.00080)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),(lnY )3 8.86391
(0.00061)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3 0.31384
(0.81526)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )3 5.86152
(0.00199)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2 5.46786
(0.00296)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2 6.03387
(0.00168)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )3 6.06071
(0.00163)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2 4.41644
(0.00474)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3 4.18769
(0.00632)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3 4.43025
(0.00465)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )3 4.43572
(0.00463)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,(lnY )3 4.60140
(0.00376)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 4.47961
(0.00438)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3 3.57762
(0.00929)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2,(lnY )3 3.59370
(0.00908)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 3.59871
(0.00901)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,ln(K/Y )3,(lnY )3 3.60884
(0.00888)
Notes: The Null Hypothesis is that additional variables of Speciﬁe dM o d e lj o i n t l ye q u a lt o0 .
The dependent variable is skilled-labor share of the wage bill (S1). All of the speciﬁcations above
were run with a constant. p-values are given in parentheses. Bold values indicate signiﬁcance at
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Table A4: Model 2 vs. Speciﬁed Model (cont.)
Speciﬁcation Test Statistic
(p-value)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 3.19963
(0.01216)
ln(K/Y ),[ln(K/Y )]2 0.89467
(0.34950)
ln(K/Y ),(lnY )2 13.24819
(0.00073)
ln(K/Y ),(lnY )3 13.64323
(0.00062)
ln(K/Y ),[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3 0.45540
(0.63729)
ln(K/Y ),[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )3 6.72404
(0.00292)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2 6.40872
(0.00372)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2 6.85644
(0.00265)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )3 6.88318
(0.00260)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2 4.46233
(0.00840)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3 4.35192
(0.00945)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3 4.48219
(0.00823)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )3 4.47959
(0.00825)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3 4.35192
(0.00945)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3 4.48219
(0.00823)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )3 4.47959
(0.00825)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,(lnY )3 4.68011
(0.00668)
ln(K/Y ),[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 4.55642
(0.00761)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2,(lnY )3 3.42679
(0.01683)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3 3.38401
(0.01780)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 3.40098
(0.01741)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 3.44825
(0.01637)
ln(K/Y ),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]2,(lnY )2,[ln(K/Y )]3,(lnY )3 2.92875
(0.02441)
Notes: The Null Hypothesis is that additional variables of Speciﬁe dM o d e lj o i n t l ye q u a lt o0 .
The dependent variable is skilled-labor share of the wage bill (S1). All of the speciﬁcations above
were run with a constant. p-values are given in parentheses. Bold values indicate signiﬁcance at
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Table A5: Model 4 vs. Speciﬁed Model
Speciﬁcation Test Statistic
(p-value)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]
2 0.54173
(0.81831)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y),lnY,(lnY )
2 1.77067
(0.54336)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y),lnY,(lnY )
3 1.82891
(0.53615)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]
2 ,(lnY )
2 0.86577
(0.67467)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]
2 ,[ln(K/Y )]
3 0.53469
(0.83269)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y),lnY,(lnY )
2 ,[ln(K/Y )]
3 0.88576
(0.66655)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]
2 ,(lnY )
3 0.89367
(0.66338)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y),lnY,(lnY )
2 ,(lnY )
3 1.13347
(0.57825)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]
2 ,(lnY )
2 ,[ln(K/Y )]
3 0.72292
(0.73779)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]
2 ,(lnY )
2 ,(lnY )
3 0.74232
(0.72684)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]
2 ,[ln(K/Y )]
3 ,(lnY )
3 0.74836
(0.72345)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y),lnY,(lnY )
2 ,[ln(K/Y )]
3 ,(lnY )
3 0.76058
(0.71666)
ln(w1/w2),ln(K/Y),lnY,[ln(K/Y )]
2 ,(lnY )
2 ,[ln(K/Y )]
3 ,(lnY )
3 0.84822
(0.66446)
Notes: The Null Hypothesis is that additional variables of Speciﬁe dM o d e lj o i n t l ye q u a lt o0 .
The dependent variable is skilled-labor share of the wage bill (S1). All of the speciﬁcations above
were run with a constant. p-values are given in parentheses. Bold values indicate signiﬁcance at
the 5% level.